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This paper focuses on vehicle-embedded decision autonomy and the hu-man operator’s role in so-called autonomous systems. Autonomy control 
and authority sharing are discussed, and the possible effects of authority 
conflicts on the human operator’s cognition and situation awareness are 
highlighted. As an illustration, an experiment conducted at ISAE (the French 
Aeronautical and Space Institute) shows that the occurrence of a conflict 
leads to a perseveration behavior and attentional tunneling of the operator. 
Formal methods are discussed to infer such attentional impairment from 
the monitoring of physiological and behavioral measures and some results 
are given. 
Introduction 
There is a growing interest in unmanned vehicles for civilian or military 
applications, since they prevent the exposure of human operators to 
hazardous situations. In these domains, autonomy is crucial because 
the human operator is not embedded within the system [50] and ha-
zardous events may interfere with the human-robot interactions (e.g. 
communication breakdowns and latencies). The design of authority 
sharing is therefore critical [29], because conflicts between the robot 
and the human operator are likely to compromise the mission [38, 
52]. Interestingly, these findings are consistent with research in avia-
tion psychology: crew-automation conflicts known as “automation 
surprises” [40, 41] occur when the autopilot does not behave as ex-
pected by the crew (e.g. the autopilot has disconnected and the crew, 
who is not flying, is not aware of that [35]). These situations can lead 
to accidents with an airworthy airplane if, despite the presence of 
auditory warnings [3], the crew persists in solving a minor conflict 
[4] «instead of switching to another means or a more direct means 
to accomplish their flight path management goals» [56]. Flight simu-
lator experiments show that in the case of a cognitive conflict with 
the mission management systems, the human operators’ attentional 
resources are almost exclusively engaged in solving the conflict [17] 
to the extent that critical information such as visual or auditory alarms 
are neglected [18] - a phenomenon known as attentional tunneling 
[54].
Conflicts in a human-machine system stem from the fact that either 
the plan for the human operator or the machine is not being followed 
anymore, or the operator has a faulty awareness of the situation [53], 
or both. In order to prevent mission degradation, the agents’ plans 
and, if need be, the authority allocation must be adapted, either to fit in 
with the authority change, or to go against it. This is a real challenge, 
since in human-machine systems the human agent is hardly control-
lable and no “model” of the human’s decision processes is available.
In this paper we will focus on autonomy and the human operator’s 
role in autonomous systems. Then autonomy control will be dis-
cussed, before highlighting authority sharing and authority conflicts 
and discussing the possible effects of such authority conflicts on the 
human operator’s cognition and situation awareness. As an illustra-
tion, we will highlight an experiment conducted at ISAE (the French 
Aeronautical and Space Institute) to show that the occurrence of a 
conflict leads to a perseveration behavior and attentional tunneling 
and that such an attentional impairment can be inferred thanks to the 
monitoring of physiological and behavioral measures.
Box 1 - Perseveration and attentional tunneling
Lessons learned from aeronautics and recent experimental research in aeronautics [17, 37] have shown that the occurrence of a conflict 
during flight management (e.g.: pilot-system conflict, pilot-co-pilot conflict, etc.) causes cognitive and emotional disorders and leads 
to perseveration. This particular behavior, which is studied in neuropsychology [51] and psychology [2], is known to summon up all 
of the pilot’s mental efforts toward a single objective (excessive focus on a single display or focus of the pilot’s reasoning on a single 
task). Once entangled in perseveration, the pilot does anything to succeed in their objective even if it is dangerous in terms of safety. His 
attentional abilities are impaired, with a tendency to attentional tunneling: any kind of information that could question his reasoning (like 
alarms or data on displays) is ignored. These findings are akin to a recently published report of the BEA (the French national institute for 
air accident analysis) that reveals that attentional tunneling has been responsible for more than 40% of casualties in air crashes (light 
aircraft). 
Autonomy and the human operator’s role
In this paper, autonomy stands for decision autonomy, i.e. an “auto-
nomous” agent has the ability to make decisions on its own with em-
bedded situation assessment and decision and planning functions. In 
ALFUS, methodology autonomy is defined as “a UMS’s own ability of 
sensing, perceiving, analyzing, communicating, planning, decision-
making, and acting/executing, to achieve its goals as assigned by its 
human operator(s) through designed HRI [30]”.
While there is no universal definition of autonomy, this concept can 
be seen as a relational notion between some agents about an object 
[9, 6]: agent X is autonomous with respect to agent Y about goal G. 
In a social context, other agents or institutions may influence a given 
agent, thus affecting its decision making freedom and its behavior 
[8]. In the context of a robot or software agent in the real world, auto-
nomy can be seen as the ability of the agent to minimize the need 
of human supervision and to act alone [43]: the primary focus is 
then the operational aspect of autonomy rather than the social one. 
In this context, pure autonomy is just a particular case of the artificial 
agent - human agent relationship, precisely consisting in not using 
this relationship. However, in practice, human supervision is needed 
since (1) algorithms can only do what they are designed for and can-
not cope with unknown situations [7]; (2) some decisions must be 
taken by a human being (e.g. in military contexts); (3) the human 
operator must be able to take over from the algorithms. Moreover, it 
seems that human interventions significantly improve performance 
over time compared to a neglected agent [24, 23]: neglect corres-
ponds to communication delays between the human operator and the 
artificial agent or moments when the human operator is absent or 
busy with other tasks. Therefore autonomy is still needed to make 
up for neglect, especially when the operators are far away and com-
munication is not permanent (for security reasons or because of the 
physics of the system, e.g. the space domain).
In order to take advantage of the complementary skills of the human 
and artificial agents [31], autonomy variation has been widely consi-
dered in the literature: (YDOXDWLYHDSSURDFKHVVXFKDV0$30RELOLW\$FTXLVLWLRQDQG3URWHFWLRQ>@$&/$XWRQRPRXV&RQWURO/HYHO>@RU$/)86
[28] a posteriori assess the autonomy of a robot agent used in a 
particular mission. Nevertheless, the assessments are either very 
general and qualitative (ACL), or quantitative with a lack of semantics 
(e.g. ALFUS final score is an aggregation of three different scores 
assessing mission complexity, environmental complexity and human 
independence [30]).  3UHVFULSWLYHDSSURDFKHVIRFXVRQWKHGHVLJQRI´DXWRQRPRXVµ
systems, including human control, with the issues of autonomy levels 
and how to switch levels. These approaches a several features, i.e. the 
roles and tasks of each agent within the system, initiative modes, the 
criteria for autonomy evolution and how the human operator is per-
ceived by the artificial agent. They are dealt with in the next section. 
Box 2 - Automation vs. Autonomy
Both terms refer to processes that may be executed independently from start to finish without human intervention. Automated processes 
simply replace routine manual processes with software/hardware ones that follow a step-by-step sequence, which may include human 
participation. Autonomous processes, on the other hand, have the more ambitious goal of emulating human processes rather than 
simply replacing them [49]. It is the difference between a washing machine and a scouting mission: the first one performs human-less 
operation whereas the second one shows human-like performance [30].
Example: a cruise missile is not autonomous but automatic since all choices have been made prior to launch [11].
Autonomy variation and autonomy control
Roles and tasks
A role is designed as a set of tasks to be achieved by a given agent 
[25]. Autonomy-level based prescriptive approaches then specify 
how the roles should be shared out between the human and the arti-
ficial agent. As early as in 1978 Sheridan [47] published a ten-level 
automation scale for a robotic system: nevertheless, it is an abstract 
model that does not take into account the environment complexity, or 
the mission of the robot. Since then, several other scales have been 
proposed, e.g. [19] for which an autonomy level is characterized by 
the complexity of the processed controls, [24] where a level repre-
sents the capacity of the robot to work independently from the human 
operator or [5] which claim that the agents’ roles vary according to 
the tasks they must do, they are allowed to do or can do, and the 
initiative they have to perform them.
The main limits of these approaches are the following:  DWDJLYHQDXWRQRP\OHYHOWKHDJHQWV·UROHVFDQQRWHYROYH
 WKHUHLVDOLPLWHGQXPEHURIOHYHOVWKHUHIRUHDULJLGIUDPHZRUN
is set and the variety of the situations encountered during a mission 
cannot be taken into account;  QRUXOHVDUHJLYHQWRVZLWFKOHYHOV WKHVFDOHVDUHHLWKHUYHU\JHQHUDODQGDEVWUDFWRUGHGLFDWHGWR
a particular system. 
Autonomy may also be considered at the task level [46, 21]: an agent 
is autonomous to achieve a task whenever this task is allocated to 
it. This approach is more appropriate to deal with the features of a 
particular mission, nevertheless defining the “best” agent to achieve 
a given task is an issue in itself.
Initiative modes
Initiative modes are related to the dynamics of the artificial agents’ 
autonomy: which of the artificial agent and the human agent can 
change the autonomy level of the artificial agent?  Three initiative 
modes are highlighted in the literature: adaptive autonomy, giving 
the artificial agent exclusive control; adjustable autonomy, giving the 
human agent exclusive control; and mixed initiative, where the human 
and artificial agents collaborate to maintain the best perceived level 
of autonomy [25].
Adaptive autonomy mainly implements the capacity of the artificial 
agent to ask for the human operator’s help, or to self-control. For 
instance [42] endow robot agents with learning capabilities allowing 
them to better manage the need for human intervention. Fong’s 
collaborative control [22] is an approach aimed at creating dialogs 
between the operator and the robot: the robot sends requests to the 
human operator when problems occur so that these are able to pro-
vide the needed support. [10] design agents that can diagnose their 
own states and self-adapt thanks to predefined behaviors.
The main advantage of adaptive autonomy is that it allows the beha-
viors of the artificial agent to be well defined for well-identified tasks 
and situations. Moreover, reactions may be triggered faster than un-
der human control. However, human operators cannot take over from 
the artificial agent whenever they want, especially when they believe 
the artificial agent behaves wrongly: their interaction with the artificial 
agent is restricted to what is expected from them [25].
On the contrary, adjustable autonomy is when only the human opera-
tor can control the artificial agent autonomy: the operator may choose 
the interaction level [19] or “advise” the artificial agent through beha-
vioral or enabling rules [36]. Then, the human operator can analyze 
the situation, anticipate disruptive events and take over from the arti-
ficial agent. The main drawback is that performance may decrease 
when the operator reacts too slowly or wrongly: the human operator’s 
actions on the artificial agent are not always beneficial [45].
The underlying idea of mixed initiative is to take advantage of the skills 
of both agents. [46] base task allocation between the robot and the 
operator on statistics to determine which agent will be the most effi-
cient. This does not guarantee success, because statistics summarize 
very different situations. However, autonomy tuning at the task level 
is an interesting idea, since it provides the most adaptive solution to 
the mission. On a similar principle, [44] build a model allowing artifi-
cial agents and human operators to transfer decision making to each 
other and to compare their decisions. Inconsistencies in the team can 
be detected so that they can be solved. While the idea of inconsisten-
cies seems to be really relevant in the context of a team of agents, the 
authors do not say how they should be solved: who should have the 
priority if the artificial agent and the human operator disagree? 
Mixed initiative seems to be the best approach, however it must be 
tuned properly to show its benefits in practice [25].
Criteria for autonomy evolution
As far as adaptive autonomy and mixed initiative are concerned se-
veral operational criteria have been proposed for the artificial agent WR FKDQJH LWV DXWRQRP\0DUNRY'HFLVLRQ3URFHVVHV DUHSURSRVHG
by [42] and [44], in order for the artificial agent to decide changes, 
especially to give the authority to the human agent. Furthermore, [44] 
deal with the possible inconsistencies among the agents’ decisions. 
Such an approach needs to be able to compute the utility of each 
strategy. The criteria of [25] are explicit, since autonomy changes are 
triggered by predefined events (i.e. some human operator’s actions, 
some mission events). Those criteria are objective, however they 
are very mission- and task-dependent. As far as the work of [36] 
is concerned, the behavior of the robot agent changes according to 
predefined rules; however, the potential conflicts between rules are 
not discussed.
Various criteria and metrics have been proposed in the literature to 
trigger autonomy changes in the artificial agent. Though they are 
grounded on objective mission features, they are generally very mis-
sion-dependent and therefore not re-usable in other contexts.
How is the human operator perceived by the artificial agent? 
Generally speaking and even if it is likely to be erroneous, the human 
operator has knowledge of the capacities of the artificial agent and 
of its current and possible future states (situation awareness [20]). 
Conversely, when adaptive autonomy or mixed initiative are consi-
dered, the artificial agent should have a model of the human opera-
tor’s “capacities” and “state”. This is hardly the case in the literature, 
since the operator is often considered as an infallible resort. Some 
examples however can be found [31, 21] where the robot has models 
of the tasks the operator can perform: therefore, it can plan for itself 
and for the operator and track the operator’s task execution.
More recent research [1, 12] considers some data from the operator 
(such as physiological data, eye tracking, expertise, workload) to take 
part in the reasoning process of the artificial agent, thus allowing it 
to adapt its autonomy when an “impaired state” of the operator is 
diagnosed. We will focus on that approach in the rest of the paper.
From autonomy to authority
Joining human and machine abilities aims at increasing the range of 
actions of “autonomous” systems. However, the relationship between 
both agents is dissymmetric, since the human operator’s “failures” 
are often neglected when designing the system. Moreover, simulta-
neous decisions and actions of the artificial and the human agents are 
likely to create conflicts [16]: unexpected or misunderstood authority 
changes may lead to inefficient, dangerous or catastrophic situations. 
Therefore, in order to consider the human agent and the artificial agent 
in the same way [27] and the human-machine system as a whole 
[55], it seems more relevant to work on authority and authority control 
than on autonomy, which concerns the artificial agent exclusively. 
Authority sharing and authority conflicts
One of the main issues in human-machine systems is to prevent the 
whole system from deteriorating and reaching undesired and possible 
dangerous states; this includes on-line failure detection and recovery, 
the maintenance of the operator’s situation awareness and correct 
interaction with the artificial agent, as well as authority conflict detec-
tion and solving.
A change in authority allocation can be planned in the procedures or 
in the mission plan, or can be unexpected: this happens when the 
human operator takes over a task controlled by the artificial agent 
(software or robot) because they detect a failure, or for any reason 
of their own; or when the artificial agent takes over a task control-
led by the operator because the operator’s action violates some 
constraints (e.g. a potential excursion out of the flight domain), or 
because the communication with the operator is impaired; or when 
no agent has the authority anymore [35]. Therefore authority has 
to be formalized in order to identify those situations so as potential 
authority conflicts.
Authority: some definitions
An agent X has authority over a resource R of a system with respect 
to another agent Y [34] if X can control R to the detriment of Y. The 
control of X on R can be more or less strong against Y according to 
the following modes:  DFFHVVDJHQW;FDQXVHUHVRXUFH5LQRUGHUWRDFKLHYHDJRDO SUHHPSWDELOLW\DJHQW;FDQXVHUHVRXUFH5DVVRRQDVQHHGHG
taking it from agent Y if Y is already controlling R;  FRQWUROJXDUDQWHHRQFHDJHQW;FRQWUROV5DJHQW<ZLOOQRWEH
able to take R away from X through pre-emption. 
Consequently authority is characterized by the following properties:  DJUDGDWLRQRI WKHDJHQW·V DXWKRULW\ DJHQW;·VFRQWURO RQ UH-
source R gets stronger as it is granted access, pre-emptability and 
control guarantee, in this order;  DXWKRULW\DVDXWRQRP\>@LVDUHODWLYHFRQFHSWDJHQW;PD\
have pre-emptability on R over agent Y, but not over agent Z. Conse-
quently, there are as many authority relationships as there are couples 
of agents that may control R;  DXWKRULW\LVVKDUHGEHWZHHQWKHDJHQWVIRUDFRXSOHRIDJHQWV
<X,Y> that may control resource R, the authority gain of agent X on 
resource R corresponds to an authority loss for agent Y. For instance, 
if agent X obtains the control guarantee on R, this means agent Y 
loses pre-emptability. Consequently, agent Y will not have access to R 
anymore: agent X prevents agent Y from accessing resource R, even 
if it does not use it. 
7KH3HWULQHWLQILJXUHUHSUHVHQWVWKHDXWKRULW\UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ
two agents, X et Y, for a given resource R: each place corresponds to 
the State of agent X / State of agent Y regarding resource R. The state 
changes modify the status of R, i.e. they determine whether R can be 
allocated to X or Y, or not.
There are two intermediate states for which the agents’ authority is HTXLYDOHQWQDPHO\$FFHVV$FFHVVDQG3UHHPSWDELOLW\3UHHP-
ptability). As far as the first one is concerned, the agents cannot take 
the resource control from one another, each must wait for the other 
one to release the resource. This is a cooperation context. As far 
as the second one is concerned, the agents can take the resource 
control from one another indefinitely, which makes the behavior of the 
system inefficient or even dangerous. This is a competition context.
 
Figure 1 - Authority relationship between two agents X and Y 
on a given resource R
Authority conflicts
A conflict is a state of the world where one or several agents cannot 
achieve their goals: agent X is in conflict with agent Y if one of Y’s 
goals prevents X from achieving one of its goals. Except for state (Ac-
cess / Access), which corresponds to both agents having the lowest 
authority over resource R, all other states of the authority relationship 
are potential conflicts, since one agent has more authority than the RWKHURYHU5RUERWKDJHQWVKDYH3UHHPSWDELOLW\FRPSHWLWLRQIRU5
Authority conflicts between the human operator and “autonomous” 
systems are often linked to “automation surprise” [41]: either the plan 
for both the human and robot is not followed anymore, or the operator 
has a faulty awareness of the situation [53], or both.
Experiments conducted in flight simulators reveal that the occurrence 
of such conflicts in mission management systems [17] leads to sum-
moning up most of the human operator’s capacities toward conflict 
solving. As a consequence, the operator’s cognitive abilities are 
impaired with a strong tendency to attentional tunneling [54], where 
critical information, such as visual or audio alarms [18], is neglected. 
Because this critical information is not perceived, the human opera-
tor’s situation awareness is degraded, which may lead to a dangerous 
vicious circle (see figure 2).
Figure 2 - The vicious circle of authority conflicts
Conflict detection and solving
Conflict detection and solving in human-machine systems involve 
(figure 3):  DQHVWLPDWLRQRI WKHVWDWHRI WKHZKROHKXPDQURERWV\VWHP
i.e. an estimation of the state of the robot, of the «state» of the human 
operator and of the state of the interaction between the two; conflicts 
Attentional tunneling
Authority conflict
Wrong situation
awareness
Unexpected
change in the plan
3UHHPSWDELOLW\3UHHPSWDELOLW\
Ag X gain Ag X gain
Ag X loss
Ag X loss
Ag X loss
Ag X gain
Ag Y gainAg Y gain
Ag Y loss
Ag Y loss Ag Y loss
Access/Access
1RDFFHVV3UHHPSWDELOLW\$FFHVV3UHHPSWDELOLW\ 3UHHPSWDELOLW\$FFHVV3UHHPSWDELOLW\1RDFFHVV
Ag Y gain
correspond to inconsistent or unwanted states of the human-robot 
system;  FRQIOLFWVROYLQJWKDQNVWRDQDGDSWDWLRQRIWKHKXPDQPDFKLQH
system, i.e. re-planning, changes in authority sharing [34, 33], cogni-
tive countermeasure sending [18].
Figure 3 - Conflict solving and the role of the human operator “state” 
estimation
State estimation
State estimation results from the matching between measures and 
models of the expected behaviors of the human-machine system. 
Conflict markers are inconsistent states (e.g. a dead marking in a 3HWULQHWUHSUHVHQWLQJWKHRSHUDWLRQRIWKHV\VWHPDQGRUPHDVXUHV
matching a model of an unwanted behavior (e.g. the operator’s atten-
tional tunneling).
Several kinds of measures are required to estimate the state of the 
human-machine system: some measures linked to the state of the 
physical system (the machine), e.g. the configuration, the speed, 
the alarms, etc.; some measures linked to the “state” of the human 
operator; and some measures linked to the interaction between the 
human and the machine, e.g. the operator’s actions on the machine 
interfaces. The analysis of these different state vector estimations al-
lows the current and future situations to be assessed in order to adapt 
the tasks and the authority of both the human and artificial agents.
The estimation of the «state» of the human operator is a challenge. 
Indeed both data and models for recognizing special «states» are 
needed. As far as attentional tunneling is concerned, the human ope-
rator’s excessive focus is associated with a decreased saccadic acti-
vity and long concentrated eye fixations [13] and consequently less 
scanned areas of interest on the user interface [48]. The heart rate 
Box 3 - Cognitive countermeasures
Attentional tunneling is a paradox for interface designers: how can one expect to “cure” human operators from attentional tunneling if the 
alarms or systems designed to warn them are neglected?  Experiments conducted in flight simulators have shown that the absence of 
response to either auditory or visual alarms may be explained by an inability to disengage attention: the warning systems are based on 
providing the operator with additional information, but this is of little use if the warning system is not also efficient in disengaging atten-
tion from the current task [17]. By contrast, cognitive countermeasures are based on the temporary removal of information on which the 
human operator is focusing, for it to be replaced by an explicit visual stimulus in order to change the operator’s attentional focus. The 
user interface acts as a cognitive prosthesis as it performs the attentional disengagement and attentional shifting.
also confirms that the catabolic activity increases. Therefore models 
of those phenomena have to be built or learnt [32] to further charac-
terize unwanted “states” of the operator.
Conflict solving
Conflict solving consists in adapting the behavior of the machine and 
the information sent to the human operator, at least for a while. This 
may involve:  DFWLRQUHSODQQLQJDQGRUUHVRXUFHUHDOORFDWLRQZLWKLQWKHV\V-
tem (e.g. in case of a failure), possibly with goal changes (e.g. land 
on the nearest emergency landing ground);   FKDQJHV LQ VRPH DXWKRULW\ UHODWLRQVKLSV RQ VRPH UHVRXUFHV
of the human-machine system [33] (e.g. automatic protection of the 
flight domain: the autopilot can take over from the crew);   FRJQLWLYH FRXQWHUPHDVXUH VHQGLQJ WR WKH KXPDQ RSHUDWRU
through the HMI [17, 18, 14] (e.g. in case of attentional tunneling in 
the human operator). 
An experiment and some results
This section is focused on an experiment and first results that we 
have obtained for conflict identification and solving. More details can 
be found in [39, 14 and 15].
Experimental framework
Experiments have been conducted at ISAE on a target search mission 
achieved by a ground robot and a remote human operator [33, 15]. 
The human operator is equipped with an eye-tracker and with an elec-
trocardiogram device. The robot is equipped with decision functions 
that allow it to navigate while avoiding obstacles, to detect targets 
and to adapt its behavior when some disruptive events occur. Infor-
mation is available on the HMI (see Figure 4) for the human operator 
to supervise the robot and take over if necessary. As soon as a target 
is detected by the robot, the operator must take over and operate the 
robot so as to identify the target precisely. 
While the operator takes over the robot for target identification, a 
battery failure triggered by the experimenter activates a safety pro-
cedure that makes the robot go back to base autonomously. This 
event is presented on the operator’s interface via three alarms: the 
battery icon (Area 7) switches from green to orange, the piloting 
mode (Area 3) blinks twice from «manual» to «supervised», and 
the display (Area 5) shows «Back to base» in green. However, 
since this unexpected event occurs at a critical time in the mission 
when the operator is par ticularly focused on the panoramic vision 
Robot Human operator
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Video 1: despite the alarms, the operator’s gaze (red cross) is fixed on the pa-
noramic vision display. http://www.aerospacelab-journal.org/al4/authority-
management-and-conflict-solving
display (Area 8) for the identification task in manual mode, the results 
show that 9 participants out of 13 faced attentional tunneling and 
were not aware of the automation logic: the eye-tracking data showed 
that the relevant information (Areas 3, 5 and 7) had not been seen 
(see video 1). Consequently, each agent (the robot and the operator) 
persisted in fulfilling their goals, i.e. going back to base and iden-
tifying targets respectively. This is an authority conflict concerning WKH FRQWURO RI UHVRXUFH ´URERW QDYLJDWLRQµZLWK D 3UHHPSWDELOLW\ 3UHHPSWDELOLW\FRPSHWLWLYHVWDWHRIERWKDJHQWVILJXUH
Conflict solving through countermeasures
A second experiment was conducted with 11 subjects. The goal 
was to test empirically one of the possible actions to solve a conflict, 
Video 2: the countermeasure disengages the operator’s visual focus (red 
cross) from the panoramic vision and leads him to glance at the battery 
icon within 1 second. http://www.aerospacelab-journal.org/al4/authority-
management-and-conflict-solving
i.e. a planned interaction with the operator aimed at modifying the 
operator’s behavior: this cognitive countermeasure consists in re-
moving the panoramic vision display (Area 8) where the operator is 
focused, and replacing it during 4 seconds with the message ”Bat-
tery failure, robot returning to base” (see video 2). What is expec-
ted is that the operator will drop their target identification task and 
switch their attention towards the relevant areas of the interface.
The results show that 9 participants out of 11 immediately gave the 
control back to the robot to let it return to base autonomously. The 
remaining two participants claimed that they had understood the 
conflict with the countermeasure, but thought that they had enough 
time to operate the robot before the total discharge of the battery.
Figure 4 - The human-machine interface
3ODQLILFDWLRQ Reach Area Search Target Action on
target
Back to Base Base
Manual
A target has been detected. 
Take manual control to 
identify it.
Yes No
*36 Battery
USG USD
Characterization of attentional tunneling
Characterizing attentional tunneling is necessary to design models 
(figure 5 left) so as to be able to automatically detect this phenome-
non on-line (figure 5 right) and trigger relevant actions to compensate 
for it. 
Figure 5: The model is designed (left) to be used on-line (right)
Thanks to signal processing of the data collected during the experiments 
(i.e. the operator’s gaze position and heart rate) and fuzzy aggregation 
rules, first characterizations of attention tunneling have been obtained. 
The measures - percentage of time spent on the video (Area 8), number 
of areas of interest (AOIs) scanned in a defined time interval, num-
ber of changes of AOIs in a defined time interval; heart rate and heart 
rate standard deviation - are aggregated thanks to expert rules so as to 
derive the Focus and the Cardiac Stress which are in turn aggregated to 
derive the Attentional Tunneling - see [39] for more details.
As an example, figures 6 and 7 show the results for two subjects 
previously labeled by the experimenters as “Attentional tunneling” and 
“OK, conflict perceived” respectively. 
7LPHUHIHUHQFHVRQWKH[D[LVJUDGXDWHGLQVHFRQGV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3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sent): observed end of the conflict. On the time axis the alert level is 
represented by a three-color code (red, yellow and green).
As we can see for case A, the alert level goes from low (green) to high 
(red) during manual piloting. The alert level is stable on high for the rest 
of the mission. This is in accordance with the observed behavior: the 
subject faced attentional tunneling and did not understand the conflict.
Figure 6: Case A - Attentional tunneling
As for case B, the alert level goes from low to high during manual 
piloting. After the start of the conflict the alert level is stable on high. 
After the end of the conflict the alert level goes from high to medium 
(yellow) in about 5 seconds and from medium to low in about 5 more 
seconds. In this case also the calculated behavior is in accordance 
with the observed behavior.
Figure 7: Case B - OK, conflict perceived
Conclusions and further work
The main drawback of the concept of variable autonomy – though 
widely studied in the literature – is that the human operator is not 
placed on the same plane as the machine (a robot or a software 
agent): the human operator is often considered as an infallible resort 
within the human-machine system. On the other hand, the concept 
of authority allows symmetric roles to be considered: the authority 
on a given resource can be transferred from one agent to the other 
according to the context. Furthermore, the concept of conflict allows 
degraded situations within the whole human-machine system to be 
detected, provided measures that are relevant to identify or predict 
unwanted behaviors are available. Therefore, some models of the 
operator’s specific behaviors must be designed. We have shown that 
model building from experimental data gives promising results as far 
as attentional tunneling is concerned.
The main challenge in human-machine mixed initiative systems, such 
as robots or aircraft, is to avoid conflicting situations, i.e. situations 
where the operator and the decision algorithms “do not understand 
each other” and attempt to keep their authority on some resources of 
the system. Further work must focus on the closed loop involving on-
line conflict detection – thanks to further investigation of the “human” 
metrics and of the correlation of the “human” and “machine” metrics, 
and the design of robust models of degraded human behaviors; and 
on on-line conflict solving through authority dynamic management, 
so as to allocate authority to the most capable agent in the current 
context. This involves further issues, such as agents’ cohesion, the 
maintenance of the human operator’s situation awareness and the 
operator’s acceptance. Solutions allowing the operator’s actions to 
be influenced without disturbing them (e.g. “subliminal” guidance, 
actions on the operator’s situation awareness using countermea-
sures, etc.) must be further investigated Q
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